The Plague of Military Coups and the African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma

“A French-trained special forces officer, a disoriented and shaken 83-year-old president bundled out of the [presidential] palace and into a car, and promises of a new constitution and a new order.” So run the headlines about the latest military coup in Guinea that toppled the “disoriented and shaken 83-year-old” Alpha Condé. African countries are no strangers to military (and bloody) takeover. It is, after all, estimated that African countries have recorded no less than 200 coups since the years of independence, counting both successful and failed coup attempts.

In West Africa alone, Guinea is the third country to experience a violent transfer of power in the past five months. In April, Chad went through a “covert coup” that brought Mahamat Idriss Deby to power, following the sudden death of his father, Idris Deby, who spent more than three decades in power and was one of Africa's longest-serving presidents. In May, Mali experienced a second coup in just nine months, after the transitional government was overthrown by the military. But had the attempted coup on the night of March 30-31 in Niger succeeded, the unwanted statistics could have been even more staggering. Undoubtedly, this poses enormous challenges to Africa’s broader peace and security environment and, especially, to the African Union (AU)’s ambitious goal of silencing the guns across the continent and achieving sustainable peace and security.

The Need for Proactiveness, Consistency, and Boldness

Despite the complexity and distinctiveness of each case of the military takeover, one can make the case that more proactiveness and consistency from both the AU and its regional bodies (Regional Economic Communities, RECs) could reduce such growing occurrences. Just like Mali and Chad, Guinea has a long history of instability and military takeovers. Yet not enough was done to prevent Alpha Condé from extending his rule to a controversial and highly contested third term. In 2010, he became the first democratically elected leader in Guinea since its independence. But after completing the constitutionally mandated two term-limit, he amended the constitution to stay in power. Unsurprisingly, the move sparked widespread protests that were met with force and brutality. Thus, the coup came in the context of simmering and growing discontent in the country, which the military successfully took advantage of. When the authority and the legitimacy of a government are widely contested, it finds no ground to stand on when or if tested. We saw that in Afghanistan before Condé's fall, where the United States and its allies thought to have built a functioning state during the 20 years of occupation. But the people on the ground (especially the Afghan army) knew too well that they had no leadership to defend. A bold and proactive African Union and its West African regional body could have surely seen this coming.

The lack of consistency is another major faux pas for the continental body. The African Union is built on a set of common and shared values, norms, and principles, as stipulated in its various legal documents, most notable the Constitutive Act but also the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of governments. A major and most recent example of inconsistency in relation to the topic at hand is the open endorsement of what was clearly an unconstitutional change of government in Chad following the death of its former president Idriss Déby. By designating Déby’s son, the military power grab clearly violated Article 81 of the Chadian constitution, which states that the president of the National Assembly would act as interim president in such circumstances and calls for elections to be held within 45–90 days. Instead, the military quickly dissolved the National Assembly and the government and suspended the constitution. It set itself to assume total power over the 18-month transition period, with the possibility of further extending it. The inconsistent decision-making on such issues will surely help erode the AU’s authority.

The good news, however, is that it is not too late for the continental body to prove its relevance. And perhaps Guinea could serve as a wakeup call that will finally awaken it from the functional and institutional ineptness. That is, while the AU has worked hard to disincentivize coups and other forms of unconstitutional changes of government, it has not done enough to eradicate their root causes, which include election tampering, constitutional amendments by incumbents to stay in power, failed governance, etc.

Good to Know: The decision on Chad contrasts sharply with its previous decisions that almost applied membership suspension of the concerned country and various sanctions of the soldiers involved. Thus, the AU has suspended any state where the military or armed groups have clearly grabbed power over the past 20 years (as shown below).

Country	Nature of the change in power	Date	PSC decision
The Central African Republic	François Bozizé, with the help of mercenaries, overthrows president André Kolingba	March 2003	Immediate suspension
Togo	At the death of Gnassingbé Eyadema, Faure Gnassingbé comes to power with the support of the military and after a controversial revision of the constitution	February 2005	Immediate suspension (Prior to the PSC decision, Togo was suspended by ECOWAS, which also imposed sanctions on Togolese authorities)
Mauritania	A military junta led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall overthrows president Maaouiya Ould Taya	August 2005	Immediate suspension
Mauritania	Sidi Ould Cheick Abdallahi is overthrown by Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, head of the presidential guard	August 2008	Immediate suspension
Guinea	Captain Moussa Dadis Camara takes power following the death of Lansana Conté	December 2008	Suspension within five days at a second meeting of the PSC on Guinea
Madagascar	Part of the army overthrows president Marc Ravalomanana and brings Andry Rajoelina to power	March 2009	Immediate suspension
Niger	Mamadou Tandja is overthrown by soldiers	February 2010	Immediate suspension
Mali	Soldiers overthrow president Amani Toumani Touré	March 2012	Immediate suspension
Guinea-Bissau	Soldiers overthrow the interim president Raimundo Pereira	April 2012	Immediate suspension
The Central African Republic	Rebels overthrow president François Bozizé	March 2013	Immediate suspension and sanctions
Egypt	Soldiers led by Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew President Mohamed Morsi	July 2013	Immediate suspension
Burkina Faso	General Gilbert Diendéré and elements under his command briefly overthrow transitional president Michel Kafando	September 2015	Immediate suspension and sanctions
Sudan	The military deposes president Omar al-Bashir following months of public protests against the regime	April 2019	Delayed suspension:
			the PSC initially gave the military two weeks to hand over power to civilians. The deadline was subsequently extended to 60 days. Following protests and the killing of civilians, the PSC suspended Sudan about three weeks before the new deadline.
Mali	Soldiers depose president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta following several weeks of public protests against the regime	August 2020	Immediate suspension
Mali	Soldiers toppled the transitional government to now take over complete control	June 2021	Immediate suspension

Africa's Fallen Stars

Western democracies should learn that the key to establishing liberal values in Africa lies with institutions, not individuals

                       By Carine Kaneza Nantulya for Persuasion

Western democracies should have learned an important foreign policy lesson by now: Placing trust in individual leaders rather than in democratic institutions often leads to disaster. This has happened all over the world, with depressing frequency. Ethiopia’s recent descent into authoritarianism and armed conflict—a mere two years after its prime minister accepted the Nobel Peace Prize at Oslo’s City Hall—is an astonishing example of the all-too-familiar story.

These leaders come into office promising to lift their countries out of crisis by safeguarding human rights, building new democratic institutions, and securing the rule of law. For a while, their countries seem to make strides, and the West holds them up as models for reform. In time, however, these once-promising leaders abandon their early commitments and fall from grace as their countries slip back into crisis.

Here are some of Africa’s fallen stars: countries and leaders at first welcomed wholeheartedly by Western democratic governments, now failing to live up to their promises. 

Ethiopia

Abiy Ahmed Ali rose to power in 2018 following widespread, popular protests and his promises to democratize Ethiopia. After decades of repression under the Ethiopia People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front, Abiy projected an ambitious reformist agenda hailed as a political breakthrough for the country. He continued to release political prisoners, a process initiated by his predecessor; invited exiles back; and implemented a number of legal reforms. For negotiating a peace agreement with Ethiopia’s arch-rival, Eritrea, he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.  

Domestically, however, the authorities were cracking down on dissent. Government security agents carried out abusive operations against individuals and armed groups in the regional state of Oromia. Intercommunal violence and attacks against minority communities escalated in several regions, leading to killings, displacement, and property damage.

Then, in November 2020, Abiy ordered military operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the dominant party in the former ruling coalition. Under Abiy’s watch, the Ethiopian military and regional forces have both committed their own atrocities and failed to prevent serious abuses by Eritrean forces operating inside Ethiopian borders in the Tigray region. Over 90 percent of the Tigray population now requires emergency food aid, according to the World Food Program.  

Abiy’s fall from grace, from a darling of the international community to the subject of widespread condemnation, was swift but, to closer observers, perhaps unsurprising. A former soldier and founder of Ethiopia’s repressive surveillance and security agency, Abiy apparently never fully outgrew his military roots. 

Chad

On taking power in 1990 after the brutal eight-year rule of Hissene Habre, the late Chadian president, Idriss Déby Itno promised to create a new society founded on democracy. His government convened a national conference to draw up a new constitution, one that assured fundamental freedoms and basic human rights. But the promise did not last long. Chad’s first elections, in 1996, were marred by allegations of fraud, a pattern that has repeated itself ever since.

By the mid-2000s, Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement had abandoned its reformist agenda and focused on entrenching its leader in power indefinitely. Déby rolled back the reforms introduced in the 1990s and steadily militarized the state and key institutions. The more Déby entrenched himself, the more members of his inner circle broke away and joined rebel groups.

There was hardly any effort by international actors to step in. Déby positioned himself as a staunch security ally of major Western powers such as France and the U.S. in a region wracked by armed insurgencies and instability, and his excesses were overlooked. When Déby died on the battlefield in April, days before starting his sixth term, he left a government with a long track record of cracking down on fundamental freedoms. His son, General Mahamat Idris Déby, has replaced him. Thirty years after the promise of democracy, Chad’s government is instead ruled by dynastic succession. 

Uganda

Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, castigating leaders who cling to power and overstay their welcome. Yet he is still in power 35 years later. In 2017, his government removed presidential term and age limits from the constitution, effectively setting him up to be president for life. The most recent elections, in January, were marred by violence and intimidation. Security forces killed protesters; carried out enforced disappearances, with some of the victims turning up dead or severely tortured; and arrested members of political opposition parties and presidential candidates.  

Opposition politicians have petitioned the International Criminal Court to investigate Museveni’s alleged human rights abuses. Western powers, though, have regarded him as a guarantor of stability in the region. He committed Uganda to the Global War on Terrorism; sent forces to Somalia to fight an armed group linked to Al-Qaeda; and even allowed private firms to recruit Ugandan manpower to protect U.S. embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The U.S. once famously hailed Museveni as part of “a new breed of African leaders,” and he was described as second in stature only to Nelson Mandela. Oxford University started a scholarship in his name to support Africans pursuing a Ph.D. in philosophy. Although he has far from lived up to these accolades, he has leveraged his reputation as a Western ally to shore up his power and international image. 

South Sudan

When South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, the international community had high hopes, believing that the new country would emerge as an example for democracy, religious freedom, and national unity. It had, after all, come about following a 22-year armed struggle by the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement against the repressive rule of Sudan’s Islamist government.

When Salva Kiir became president of the new nation, he promised to create a democratic, peaceful, and united South Sudan. But the stability and optimism wouldn't last long. In mid-December of 2013, a vicious civil war triggered by a power struggle between President Kiir and his then-deputy, Riek Machar, and other senior SPLM leaders threw the country into chaos. The war was marked by horrific cruelty and violence. Civilians bore the brunt of war, with all sides targeting them for abuse.

In their rush to support the newest state on the international stage, world leaders had ignored signs of this impending crisis. The region that would become South Sudan had suffered two brutal civil wars during the last half-century. As a result, in 2011, the new leadership inherited a country plagued by corruption, neglect, ethnic and regional tension, and displacement; millions remain refugees both within and outside of the country. The international community’s optimism had blinded it to the instability beneath South Sudan’s promising exterior.

Consequently, a decade into independence, and despite the ongoing implementation of a 2018 peace agreement between President Kiir and rebel factions, the promised dividends of statehood—including stability, basic freedoms, and economic development—remain elusive.  

What should the international community learn from these examples?

First, institutions, not individuals, are the best predictors of long-term reform. That is the case no matter how capable the leaders are and how much they profess their democratic credentials. Too often, the international community has feted promising leaders in its search for success stories, first ignoring warning signs and then under-investing in strengthening institutions.

Second, sacrificing the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in the name of stability has tragic consequences, both for the people of authoritarian regimes and for the future prospects for democracy across Africa. Moreover, each of the countries highlighted remains deeply unstable—a sign that sacrificing democracy in the name of stability is rarely successful.

Authoritarian world powers, including China and Russia, often design their foreign policy with an overriding focus on stability. When Western democracies do the same, they strengthen the argument that there is little fundamental difference between authoritarian government calculations and democratic ones. Instead, the international community of liberal democracies must distinguish itself and encourage the hard work of building institutions devoted to liberal and democratic values.

Carine Kaneza Nantulya is Africa advocacy director at Human Rights Watch.

China and Russia Both Cooperating and Competing in Africa

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 103

By: Paul Goble

Russia and China are typically lumped together as the two new challengers to the role of Western countries in Africa. They are certainly that, but they are pursuing rather differing strategies and, thus, are virtually certain to find themselves at odds in the future. Moscow has sought short-term advantage, by which it hopes to profit from Western neglect. But as a result, the Russian side is likely to fall even further behind China, which is pursuing a much longer-term approach that involves integrating sub-Saharan Africa into Beijing’s One Belt, One Road program (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI). For the present, these two approaches may not be completely at odds; however, in the longer term, they are prone to be, with Russia having to accept a role subordinate to China in Africa or give up its current relationships with African countries. That is not something President Vladimir Putin is likely to be happy about and may even become an increasing source of conflict between Moscow and Beijing. 

Russia’s outreach to Africa had heretofore been defined by an almost exclusive focus on what might be called “targets of opportunity”: weak countries with governments threatened by unrest and lacking outside support from the West or from China but that have important raw materials reserves, such as gold and diamonds, that the Russian regime might profit from (see EDM, April 23, 2020, April 29, 2020, January 20, 2021). Indeed, in the words of one Moscow-based commentator, Aleksandr Golts, Putin has acted in Africa on the assumption that when he does intervene there, Russia will be the strongest or even the only outside player that matters. The problem with this Kremlin-perceived “Jurassic Park world,” as Golts terms it, is that it diverges from the reality on the ground. And in fact, other powers, including a rising China, act in ways that preclude Russia from achieving its goals there because others—China included—are willing to invest into further developing the continent and not just exploiting the status quo (Ej.ru, October 29, 2019). 

China approaches Africa as it does most parts of the world, with longer-term objectives in mind. In Africa, this has meant inter alia building east-west rail lines to link the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic together, thus creating yet another avenue for the expansion of trade and influence between this continent and the Asia-Pacific region (see China Brief, July 22, 2010 and April 9, 2018). To make that happen, China has invested heavily in countries along this route, something that wins it more friends than does Russia’s siloviki (security services) driven and heavy-handed exploitation of their resources. As China’s BRI project continues to expand, the conflict between Beijing’s and Moscow’s rival approaches in Africa—and more generally—is becoming clearer. And at least some in the Russian capital are beginning to take notice. 

The well-connected Moscow-based analytical portal Real Tribune draws on Chinese reporting to suggest that China is stealing a march on all other outside powers because of its long-term Africa strategy and because it has invested more in the countries along the railway routes it is building across the content. In other words, the piece argues, China is offering more than simply exploiting the economic resources of these countries, as European colonial powers did in the past or as Russia, in many respects, is doing now (Real Tribune, South China Morning Post, June 27). 

According to the Real Tribune analysts, “China is building railways in Africa in support of the local economies.” As a result, “over the last decade, Beijing has strengthened its position as the most important contractor and sponsor of infrastructure in Africa,” building not only railroads but ports and supporting facilities that naturally help China, while also promoting the development of the national economies. For that reason, and bolstered by the fact that China is also non-white, Beijing has outcompeted European powers, which have cut back their investments or had a legacy of exploiting their former colonies. By that same token, Chinese activities have outmatched Russia’s, with the latter country not in a position, economically, to invest anything close to what China is spending—some $1.3 billion in the past several years alone (Real Tribune, June 27). 

Moreover, China is active across the continent and not just in troubled countries, building transcontinental railways rather than simply tracks from the interiors of some countries to coastal ports, as other powers have done. At present, Real Tribune notes, Beijing is working both west to east in Nigeria and east to west in Tanzania. And these plans—which the Chinese loudly promote and Africans appreciate—mean that China may very well be on its way to becoming the dominant outside power on the continent. In that event, Moscow will be forced to recalculate its own strategy given that there is now a real outside power in Africa, not the power vacuum Putin has counted on in the past. 

And Chinese outlets are playing up something else. They are pointing to the fact that what China is doing presently builds on past actions. It is not a short-term policy that Beijing can and will change overnight—a sharp contrast to Moscow’s activities in sub-Saharan Africa, where the Russian approach has been on-again, off-again. Even now, the Chinese are citing former Communist leader Mao Zedong’s observation in 1965 to Julius Nyerere, who was then the president of Tanzania: “In the past, foreigners built railroads in Africa to steal Africa’s wealth. The Chinese are doing so with an entirely different goal,” he said. “They are building them to help us both in the development of our national economies” (Real Tribune, June 27). 

Up to now and perhaps for a few years more, China’s new railroads in Africa may help Russia achieve some of its goals; but beyond that, Chinese railways there will have a quite different impact, one that will work against Russian interests and the current tactics Moscow is using to promote them. 

Reflecting On the Challenges of Studying “Africa” Objectively

“Africa” is a common knowledge, through daily news and pseudo-scientific publications. That is, in addition to being watched from afar, it is constantly talked about and heard of, but usually for the wrong reasons: If it is not much about a military coup in Mali (again), it would be about the intractable civil war in Libya, or the repeated terrorist attacks across the continent. Corruption is another trademark plaguing the continent, not unlike the "third termism", extreme poverty, widespread (youth) unemployment, etc. Thus, very "few objects are indeed as loaded with ordinary knowledge as this continent which appears daily in street discussions, in newspapers and on television screens" (Gazibo, 2010).

Yet, behind this “ordinary” and generalized knowledge about Africa, there is an inherent risk, especially for any observer who wants to take a lucid look at this continent that the imagination wants to be as distant as it is mysterious. That is a major challenge confronting any attempt to have an objective look at the continent. Faced with such a risk, there is a need to resort to scientific methodological approach, anchored on a neutral view of the observer and oriented towards the search for objectivity. Thus, the widespread calls for respecting “a certain number of methodological precautions” aims to prevent endeavors that claim to be scientific from being nothing other than a prop cliché or an equally damaging “angelism with a redemptive aim”, a kind of defensive posture devoid of critical self-reflection.

If the first is the product of a long and cruel history based on slavery and colonization, the second is intended to be defensive against that historical encroachment. The problem, however, is that reproducing these engrained clichés completely disregards the basic methodological principle about not making value judgments. But the uncritical “angelism” equally contravenes methodological principles about keeping objective distance and an impassionate engagement with the subject matter. But here, I’m digressing.

What is of particular interest to me here is a reflection on the conditions of production of (scientific) knowledge on Africa. As mentioned, the origin of the prejudices on Africa, of the crystallization of the negative image associated with this continent as well as the consequent obstacles to the neutrality of research on this subject matter, “Africa”, could be traced back to slavery and then colonization. In fact, according to Gazibo (2010), among other, these two phenomena were crucial moments for strengthening the distorted vision developed on Africa. Unfortunately, that logic still nourishes many works devoted to the continent. Yet, the ultimate and critical task that should preoccupy us all is for these endeavors to be faithful in their analyses of the subject of study. In order words, depicting the continent as it is with its complexity and in its ups and downs.

China’s Role in Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of East African Community

This article, published in Stanford International Policy Review, is a recent analysis I co-authored. It mainly deals with China's engagement with regional integration in Africa. We dwell on the East African Community (EAC) as a case study, mainly focusing on China's role in infrastructure development in the region and its trade policy toward the regional bloc. 

Africa’s Peace and Prosperity Begin at Home

For too long, Africa has been a strategic plaything of world powers. By bolstering its internal cohesion and economic integration, the continent can become a strong geopolitical force with an independent and unified voice on important global issues. 

Africans must take responsibility for our continent’s affairs. We have all the ingredients we need to succeed, starting with a growing population – including a large and increasingly educated cohort of young people – and a favorable trade and investment environment. And now, determined to usher in an era of African peace and prosperity, we have a mature institutional platform through which to forge, articulate, assert, and defend our common interests under an independent, unified African foreign policy. 

At a time when protectionist beggar-thy-neighbor policies are on the rise globally, Africa is poised to implement a single common market in the form of the African Continental Free Trade Area. This pact will lay new foundations for continent-wide economic growth: the World Bank recently forecast that AfCFTA could boost Africa’s income by $450 billion by 2035 and lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty. In addition, closer economic integration within the region will inevitably make every country a stakeholder in its neighbors’ security, thereby advancing the greater cause of continental peace.

As Africa integrates, it is increasingly setting its own development agenda and foreign-policy priorities freely and independently of other powers. This represents a sharp break with Africa’s historical role as a geopolitical plaything of world powers.

But dangers remain, not least in the Horn of Africa – a historically volatile region that suddenly has become the epicenter of a global scramble for strategic influence. Powerful adversaries have established military bases in the Horn that are too close to each other for comfort. Many have invested in the region’s seaports, and some have gone further inland in search of water and arable land to produce their food abroad.

The heightened interest partly stems from the region’s locational advantages as both the bridge that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and a vital entry point to the wider African market. Left unchecked, this unhealthy rivalry and competition in our backyard will likely end up sucking all of us into yet another fratricidal proxy war. Competing visions and rival loyalties to outside forces risk creating fragile states and power vacuums, turning us into easy fodder for others.

Africa’s ability to become a strong geopolitical force hinges on its own internal cohesion and economic integration. An Africa that increasingly trades with itself will create an internal market large enough for its producers to benefit from economies of scale. By investing in value-added activities, these firms can help to ensure that the continent is no longer merely a supplier of raw materials and a market for other countries’ goods and services. 

How the Galwan Valley Standoff Could Spell the End of South-South Romance

    This piece originally appeared in E-International Relations

The expanding geographic outreach of South-South Cooperation (SSC) in recent years has become a vector of hope in developing countries’ efforts to achieve development and prosperity. But the recent border clash between India and China, the world’s most populous nations and two of the most important engines of SSC, could prove a real test to SSC’s principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and third-world solidarity.  In other words, not only does the ongoing rift between the two leading voices of the South-South momentum make a mockery of the two countries’ professed commitment to the cause of the disadvantaged of the international system, but it also threatens the Global South’s ‘historic mission’ of promoting a fairer and equal world. The China-India standoff at the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas on June 15 is the deadliest clash between the two nuclear powers in more than 40 years. It also brings tensions between the two countries to their highest point in decades. And while their relations might have always been delicate and oscillating between cooperation and competition, recent developments could prove particularly worrisome for the future of SSC.

The history of SSC is often traced back to 1955, when representatives from 29 Asian and African countries gathered at a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, to not only further economic and technical cooperation among developing countries, but also to allow the downtrodden of the post-1945 global order to join forces against a West-dominated world order. As such, the Bandung conference marked a formalized turning point of Global South solidarity, with attempts to rebuild the international order to provide Southern countries equality of participation in international arenas that had regularly failed to ensure their inclusion.

It was also an opportunity for the newly independent countries to vent their frustrations over the traditional realpolitik of the day. Since then, however, SSC has evolved to become an integral and major part of the international development landscape. A case in point was the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) in 1978 to promote and implement technical and development cooperation among developing countries. In addition to driving forth much of the euphoria about its potential, this has also helped make SSC a buzz word in development parlance. The spectacular rise of the likes of China has undeniably played a significant role in that process.

Nonetheless, China’s rise also saw a shift in its diplomatic and foreign policy undertakings. As it emerges from a traditionally defensive diplomatic posture, Beijing is now increasingly perceived as a bold, assertive player fueling its ‘great power’ muscles by projecting its military might, playing the national security card to secure its interests in its immediate vicinity and far beyond. This has especially been the case under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who has repeatedly made it known that China now aspires to be a shaper of global trends. It goes without saying that Beijing’s new foreign policy posture is seen with skepticism as it is strongly reminiscent of a premature hegemonic supremacy that is spelling the end to China’s ‘charm offensive’. The assertive turn of China’s foreign policy, coupled with the increasingly nationalistic posture of Narendra Modi’s India, meant that the resurgence of the Sino-Indian border disputes is not entirely intriguing. If Xi is emboldened by his increasingly embattled ‘China Dream’, Modi seems invigorated by his version of ‘India first’, resulting in heightened risk of a military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed powers.

The standoff and the ensuing breakdown in their relations will have far-reaching consequences for SSC in the foreseeable future, given that the growing rift in New Delhi-Beijing relations is likely to cripple not just their broader engagement but also their respective cooperation with other developing countries. In a widely publicized move yet antithetical to SSC aspirations, India launched a ‘digital strike’ against China, blocking 59 Chinese apps on June 29, including the widely popular Tik Tok (with about 611 million downloads of the app made in the country, India is TikTok’s largest market, according to Sensor Tower). Though New Delhi claims the ban serves to protect India’s ‘sovereignty and security’, it is widely believed to be an economic retribution for the June 15 border clash. Indeed, cross border trade and investment will also suffer, with reports emerging that Modi’s government is cancelling a major railway contract won by a Chinese firm and considering banning the Chinese telecommunications equipment giant Huawei from its 5G network. There has also been a widespread movement to boycott Chinese products. Beyond these bilateral setbacks, however, the rift is also certain to play out in their multilateral engagement with the likes of BRICS and the UN Security Council, which India will soon join as nonpermanent member for the 2021-22 term.

Although the reported withdrawal of Chinese troops from the border area where the standoff took place and the ongoing bilateral talks could help cool the cross-border tensions, they are unlikely to undo the long-term damage and the simmering mutual distrust. Indeed, the strategic mistrust in Sino-Indian relations is likely to become a given, which might have an irredeemable long-term impact on their bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation. It might also deal a major blow to their ability to drive SSC forward in the face of a deadly global pandemic and the melting global economy that is set to hit the developing world the hardest. Clearly, an open and violent conflict between the leading powers of the developing countries does not bode well for the future of SSC and will likely make an irreparable dent in the Global South’s quest to transform the institutions of global governance and make the world a fairer and more equal place. Achieving these ambitious and oft-romanticized goals is mainly dependent on genuine partnership and synergetic cooperation among all parties concerned. This in turn also depends not only on a strong concerted voice from the Global South, but also on the added weight of major southern players such as China and India working together. If anything, the fraught relations between China and India cast a major doubt on such endeavors, while also threatening to end the discursive romance surrounding SSC in much of development space.

While the Galwan Valley standoff continues to underline the fragility of the 1962 agreement between India and China, following the war over their competing claims to the arid border region in the Himalayas, it also brings to light the underlying challenges to the much-touted solidarity of the Global South. As both countries continue their path to becoming ‘great’ nations and indispensable actors on regional and global affairs, the June incident is unlikely to go down as an aberration; rather it might be a harbinger of increasing fraught relations ahead. It could, therefore, be a critical inflection point between the two neighbors, signaling a rocky and treacherous phase of Sino-Indian relations, characterized by strategic mistrust and plenty of animosity. This might well dash the aspirations of the Global South for a better and more comprehensive SSC and put the developing world in a deep predicament for years to come.

The Twilight of an Empire: Racism, Geopolitics, and the American Question

A short version of this article was published in E-International Relations. 

Racism. Racial injustice. Police brutality. Protests. Battlespace. Black Lives Matter: A specter is haunting America—the specter of centuries-old pathologies never really addressed. When the crisis currently roiling America began, following the brutal killing of yet another unarmed black man, it should have been a decidedly domestic crisis. Instead, the outrage following the murder, compounded by the scandal-prone leadership of the Trump administration, has quickly turned what was originally an “American tragedy” into an international one with major geopolitical ramifications for years to come.

The massive demonstrations across the world in solidarity with America’s protestors is just one example of its international dimension. But a more defining factor in the internationalization of this particular saga was surely the violent response by law enforcement officers and the constant attempts to militarize the crisis. 

The self-proclaimed ‘leader of the free world’ was now terrorizing its own citizens, who took to the streets to demand justice and accountability. For many, especially those watching from countries and regions that have long been lectured on human rights issues, the whole episode was another indication of a deep-rooted hegemonic hypocrisy—“do as I say, not as I do.” Unsurprisingly, America’s geopolitical adversaries, in a characteristically opportunistic burst, have been quick to jump on the social justice bandwagon to score a few geopolitical points.

Iran branded Floyd’s death a ‘cold-blooded’ killing that reveals the true nature of the American government. Russia opted for what it usually does: flooding the Internet with divisive messages and seizing the occasion to critique Washington’s ‘repressive’ response to the unrest. Turning the geopolitical dynamics on its head, the Russian Foreign Ministry called on American authorities to respect people’s right to peacefully protest. China was also quick to jump on the fray. Beijing has been heavily reprimanded for its growing totalitarian repression aided by state-of-the-art surveillance technology, epitomized by the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and the alleged oppression of its Muslim minority in the Xinjiang autonomous region. But, if in April America was able to issue harsh and scathing criticisms against China while Beijing faced a global outcry over the racial profiling and mistreatment of African nationals, the table seems to have turned. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, posted ‘I can't breathe’ on Twitter, referring to George Floyd’s last words that have become a rallying slogan for demonstrators the world over, while China’s state-media have been actively calling on America to address racial injustice at home and stop interfering in other countries’ internal affairs. 

But the geopolitical battle between Beijing and Washington extended to Africa, where the two powers have been engaging in narrative battles to undermine each other’s broader engagements with and interests in the continent. Nonetheless, it is crucial not to overstate China’s role in Africa’s perception of race and racism issues in America—issues one could refer to as ‘the Great American Question’—if only because the dynamics and the relationship well-outdate China’s modern engagement with the continent.

From a historical vantage point, to talk about America is to talk about African slavery. And understanding that tragic history, I would suggest, is critical to understanding the reactions in Africa to the Great American Question. In July 1964, Malcolm X brought home to his ‘African brothers and sisters’ at the first summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—the predecessor of the African Union (AU)—in Cairo, Egypt, the concerns on the fate of Americans of African descent. Malcolm X’s message to African leaders at the summit, like most of his speeches, was a poignant pan-African plea. African-Americans, he said, ‘firmly believe that African problems are our problems and that our problems are African problems.…’ In part, thanks to Malcolm X’s moving imploration, the OAU passed a resolution that condemned ‘the existence of discriminatory practices’ against African-Americans and called on America ‘to intensify... efforts to ensure the total elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race, color or ethnic origin.’ This was just an instance of how America’s foreign policy towards the continent was complicated by brutal racism at home, a fact J.F. Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, once admitted: ‘the conduct of our foreign policy is handicapped by our record in the field of civil rights and racial discrimination.’

Decades later today, that egregious record still shocks and disheartens many in Africa. So it was only natural that Floyd’s killing drew widespread condemnations in the continent. For instance, the president of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, firmly condemned ‘the murder of George Floyd, which occurred in the United States of America, at the hands of law enforcement officers.’ In his statement, Mahamat recalled the OAU’s historic resolution of 1964 to reaffirm ‘the rejection by the [AU] of persistent discriminatory practices against black citizens of the United States of America.’ Likewise, in an open letter, African writers, ‘who are connected beyond geography,’ denounced the killing and expressed their strongest solidarity with the protestors. Such an outpouring of outcries across the continent forced American embassies in Africa to attempt to control the damage by making an unprecedented move to condemn the murder that took place back home.

But given America’s long history of racial caste system, enforced and sustained through violence and socio-economic oppression, such diplomatic efforts are destined to achieve very little. The foundation of the American promise, an ambitious young African-American senator who would later become America’s first black president told the 2004 Democratic National Convention, is ingrained in Americans’ belief that ‘all men are created equal,’ making it the only place on earth where his story could even be possible. The paradox, however, is that beneath that American exceptionalism also lies the foundation of the Great American Question. Obama himself knows too well how America has long denied its black people the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—the basis of the quintessentially American dream. Indeed, America is proud to have fought and won two world wars to “save” the world from fascism. It is equally proud to have “saved” the world from the oppression of godless communism.

Yet that same America has also failed to liberate its black people from perpetual oppression and subjugation at home. As a product of that brutal reality, Malcolm X warned his audience at the 1964 Cairo summit on how, to people of color, America could be as repressive and dehumanizing as South Africa’s Apartheid regime. Indeed, while the Apartheid regime ‘is like a vicious wolf, openly hostile to black humanity…, America is cunning like a fox, friendly and smiling on the surface, but even more vicious and deadly than the wolf.’ 

In that 1964 African tour, Malcolm X also dismayingly observed, this time in Ghana, that ‘for the twenty millions of [black people] in America who are of African descent,’ there is no American dream. There is only the American nightmare. Today, that nightmare seems to engulf the country and help further tarnish its global standing. The protest and the quickness with which it gained steam might be a clear sign of a troubled nation: Think of the racial injustice, the police brutality, the job losses, and the Covid-19 pandemic, which, instead of being America’s great equalizer it was deemed to be, turned out to be a black plague for Black America. Unfortunately, a clear leadership to steer the nation out of these storms has been wanting. ‘When the looting starts, the shooting starts’ is usually something one associates with some nameless militaristic state on the brink of collapse. But this fanning the flame of hatred comes from ‘the leader of the free world.’ Or perhaps, that too is an idea, just like the American dream. Little wonder, some see America becoming a fragile state whose stabilization is off the table in the near term, while others see a much gloomier picture.

America’s democracy was built on the denial of basic humanity to a large portion of its population, while its wealth and power are rooted in the plunder of its black and native inhabitants. And that could well be its undoing today. It is the specter that has been haunting America. But all is not yet lost. If anything, the sustained protests over the past weeks offer a window of opportunity to genuinely atone for these historical wrongs and, perhaps, avoid James Baldwin’s apocalyptic call for “fire next time”.

There is a consensus that racial injustice at home has eroded America’s international standing. That the country has so far failed to reconcile the values and ideals it professes to champion with what is actually happening. Thus, the repeated attempts to give an apparent solidity to pure wind have been a dramatic failure. In 1964, Malcolm X called on heads of independent African states to rescue their ‘long-lost brothers and sisters’ by bringing ‘our problem to the United Nations [Council] on Human Rights.’ Today, Philonise Floyd, George Floyd's brother, is imploring the same institution to help ‘black people in America.’ This presents a clear opportunity for America’s critics to call out its hypocrisy. Surely, Russia and China are among the last places to turn to for human rights protection. But the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman was right: ‘it’s time for the U.S. to drop the mentor’s tone and look in the mirror.’ Only then might it regain its lost grounds, both at home and abroad. 

Beyond the Pandemic: The Struggles of African Nationals in China

Recent racist anti-African incidents in China are just a manifestation of deeply rooted attitudes vis-à-vis ‘blackness’ in China that predate and will likely outlive the coronavirus pandemic. 

This piece appeared in 'Africa is a Country' under the title: China and Africa: A trial by pandemic?

“We are being systematically discriminated against as blacks and African nationals,” a Ghanaian student I spoke to and who has been under forced quarantine in Guangzhou concluded with a shaking voice. And though he has no recent travel history and no particular exposure to the virus, he was forced to take the coronavirus test, which came in negative, unsurprisingly. His was not an isolated incident of discrimination and blatant racism based on skin color and passport.

For the last few weeks, the Chinese province of Guangdong and especially its provincial capital, Guangzhou, became the focus of news reports and social media posts on widespread discriminations and mistreatments of African nationals in the city. Evictions from homes and hotels, people sleeping on the streets, the police forcefully dragging black individuals, forced-quarantine, involuntary and repeated COVID-19 tests, etcetera are some of the accusations that have been widely circulating. But the unprecedented level of outcries and indignations from African countries have also brought to surface China-Africa relations more broadly, with many quick to predict the looming end of the buoyant relationship.

In addition to a rise in imported COVID-19 cases, the targeted discriminations and racism against African nationals started after reports emerged that five Nigerian nationals in the southern city of Guangzhou, who tested positive for Covid-19, had broken a mandatory quarantine and been to multiple restaurants and other public places, and thus infecting many others in the process. Yet, since the coronavirus knows neither skin color nor national boundaries, it is surprising and particularly troubling that the crackdowns on these mischief-makers would be extended only to African nationals in the city, regardless of their travel history and risks of exposure. For example, though they were not the only foreign nationals in the group, two of my African colleagues at Peking University received repeated calls from the Guangzhou police. They had participated in a two-day class trip to the city in early December, long before the coronavirus became a health concern even in Wuhan. Yet the calls are believed to be part of ‘contact tracing’.

In a rare move, African ambassadors in Beijing issued a joint complaint to China’s foreign minister, arguing that “the singling out of Africans for compulsory testing and quarantine, in our view, has no scientific or logical basis and amounts to racism towards Africans in China.” Yet, while Chinese state media described the incidents as “small rifts,” the government, in a typical fashion, initially tried to deny the reports, instead characterizing them as “rumors,” “misunderstandings,” and stories fabricated and spread by Western media—an attempt to make the issue a new point of contention with the West (read the US). But for those familiar with Beijing’s responses to crises as sensitive as this one, the move is not surprising. In a usual fashion, the government was first slow to react to the outcry, before moving in full force to dismiss the existence of the crisis while also calling out on ill-intention forces (read Western media and their governments) for trying to drive a ‘wedge’ between Beijing and its African counterparts. To anxious African governments, China was keen to reaffirm the principle of equality and equal treatment towards all.

Therefore, instead of promptly acknowledging the wrongdoing and working to solve the problem and alleviate the pain inflicted to African nationals in the city, there is a widespread feeling that the Chinese authorities have focused more on downplaying the issue or completely denying its occurrence. The official, polished diplomatic language will have us believe, for example, that China has zero-tolerance for racism and skin-color-based discrimination. Yet, everyday reality tells a different story. Racism against black people or Africans in China has become so commonplace as to be banal. In fact, China may applaud itself for establishing a friendly relationship with many African governments, but systematic discriminations and repeated ill-treatment of African nationals in China are also well-documented. Thus, there is a clear contradiction between the lived and the experienced reality for Africans living in China and the way their governments and Chinese leaders interact. Given the current context with the coronavirus pandemic, some have explained the quickness with which many African governments has accepted Beijing’s reassurances, given China’s overall importance to Africa’s fight against the pandemic. But the fact of the matter remains that African government officials have never been comfortable and willing to officially address these issues, as they are perceived as rather too embarrassing for what is believed to a brotherly/sisterly relationship between China and Africa.

In Guangzhou specifically, recent incidents are just a manifestation or a symptom of a deeply rooted issue vis-à-vis ‘blackness’ in China that existed long before COVID-19 and will likely survive the pandemic, despite the recently announced measures to combat discrimination in Guangdong province. And though some seem to celebrate “the rising African agency… that is spilling over in the [Sino-African] relationship,” one genuinely wonders how long that will last. For one, Beijing is happiest, as always, to have the incidents quickly forgotten (at least by African leaders) while African governments are also concerned with mobilizing more support and resources in their efforts to address the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic in the continent, including appeals for medical aid and debt relief. Unsurprisingly, there is an apparent calm on the surface despite the boiling currents deep below in the China-Africa relationship.

In early March, I wrote a piece on how the coronavirus has ignited deep-rooted stereotypes about Chinese and how it was wrong to associate it with particular geography or race because it knows not such social constructs. And I am now reiterating the same call with equal vigor. The best way, indeed, the only way to effectively defeat the ongoing pandemic is by working together, collaboratively. So, beyond the staged official PR visits with TV and camera crews, it is encouraging and commendable to see many people, including Chinese nationals, join hands to bring comforts to the affected individuals throughout the city.

For both Chinese and African government officials, however, these crises should serve as an opportunity for a fact-check, especially with regard to the much-touted people-to-people exchange in China-Africa relations. And neither Beijing’s denials nor African governments’ disquieting silence is helpful for that purpose. 

Addressing the Security Implications of COVID-19 in the Sahel region

It was an honor to be invited for the African Security Talk by Conflict Free Nation team to talk about the security implications of the coronavirus pandemic in the Sahel Region. 

Indeed, as the crisis continues to wreak havoc, much of attention has been on its health and economic consequences. Yet, although these are certainly pressing issues, it should be lost to us that the pandemic is already having major impacts on the 'older' issues and might contribute to worsening them in the foreseeable future, especially if we solely focus on just addressing the new challenges brought about by COVID-19. 

 Find out more about what that means for the ongoing security challenges in the Sahel Region.

How Turkey’s Hegemonic Bet on Neo-Ottomanism with Pan-Islamist Face is Costing it Friends and Allies

Finding itself at a crossroads, increasingly isolated by its Western allies, and no longer the dominant Muslim voice it once was, Turkey is now flexing its pan-Islamist muscles.

At a pan-Islamism and anti-Islamophobia-themed meeting, recently held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at the initiative of Turkey, Malaysia, Iran, and Qatar, Turkey’s President Erdoğan seized the occasion to broadcast what has become a driving principle (in spirit, at least) of his foreign policy projections: saving the Arabo-Muslim world from the incessant, perennial onslaught of an essentially anti-Muslim global order.

In the Malaysian capital, Erdoğan spoke about resistance and the need for a robust Muslim fraternity so that the the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, surely under Turkey’s guidance, can rise to the security and socio-economic challenges of globalization and modernity.

Saving brothers in need, but also driving friends and allies away

Erdoğan’s message was clear: now is the time to revive pan-Islamism. This was later echoed by all participants of the small circle of countries who effectively styled themselves as the saviors, or the forerunners of a much-needed “Muslim coalition” to liberate the Muslim world.

There is nothing new to such pan-Islamism-flavored rhetoric in Erdoğan’s political communication toolkit. The Turkish leader has to some degree already effectively styled himself over the years as the “daring one” who stands up to the West. But the Kuala Lumpur gathering came with a more consequential twist as the MENA seeks a new economic system to extricate itself from the grasp of the all-mighty American dollar.

All this was merely a glimpse of Turkey’s regional ambitions. Just days after the Malaysia meeting, Erdoğan announced Ankara’s plans to send troops to Libya to support the beleaguered Tripoli-based and internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in its struggle against the troops of General Khalifa Haftar. 

The Turkish president said he was responding to an invitation from Tripoli as France, Italy, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Russia-backed Haftar prepared to launch a “final assault” on the capital Tripoli. Ankara, once again the savior and the righteous voice in a volatile region, was only legitimately flying to the rescue of the rightful government of Libya. The announcement was green-lighted by the Turkish parliament on January 2.

To critics and regional foes, the move was a dangerous threat to regional stability. But Erdoğan swiftly fired back, arguing that “They are helping a warlord. We are responding to an invitation from the legitimate government of Libya.”

These two episodes—the Kuala Lumpur meeting and the decision on Libya—are inextricably linked; they share the same ethical and ideological underpinnings. What they convey is the pointed nostalgia of a country determined to claim the prestige and diplomatic (or geostrategic) prominence and reverence it thinks it deserves.

Yet these same moves have been driving Turkey’s erstwhile neighboring friends and allies, including NATO, while effectively confining the carefully crafted concepts and ideals of “strategic depth,” “zero problems with neighbors,” “a center country,” and “order setter,” which were supposed to guide its foreign policy, to the long-forgotten pages of history. 

Read the full the version of this article, by Tamba François Koundouno, on Morocco World News.

China in Africa’s Peace and Security Landscape: A Politics of Double Coincidence of Wnats

This piece originally appeared in The Diplomat with the title "China in Africa’s Peace and Security Landscape" 

With growing Chinese security engagements in Africa, Sino-African relations are at a critical juncture. This is not necessarily because of the ignited international attention on what China does in Africa, but rather because of the nature of — and scintillating mutuality in — the expanding China-Africa relationships. For instance, recently China has shown unprecedented willingness and (to some extent) readiness to put its shoulder to the wheel in Africa’s efforts to deal with cycles of insecurity and instability. Likewise, aiming for an “integrated, prosperous, and peaceful [Africa],” the continent — under the aegis of the African Union (AU) — has been striving to develop better strategies in working with external partners to achieve peace and stability. It is in that regard that peace and security have increasingly gained prominence in China-Africa engagements, ranging from growing multilateral cooperation on security challenges facing Africa to nascent (sub)regional initiatives to long-held bilateral partnerships with many African countries. 

In other words, although discussions on the growing China-Africa security engagements often focus more on Beijing’s plans for the continent and less on Africa’s plans for itself, the reality is that Sino-African security relations are more symbiotic and point to a politics of coincidentally converging interests: China stands to benefit from a stable, secure, and peaceful Africa while the continent strives to eradicate insecurity and instability for its own prosperity and development. This is a crucial fact that China has come to realize, at least, in recent years, as illustrated by its broadening interest in Africa’s peace and security. 

To be sure, however, no single factor fully explains the paradigm shift in China’s security relations with Africa. But the shift aims to help protect and promote Beijing’s “hard” and “soft” national interests in the continent. First, ensuring continuous access to the continent’s vast resources certainly plays a significant role in China’s security thinking — though this factor is usually overemphasized to the extent that other equally important calculations are overlooked altogether. Second, accessing the growing African market — thanks to a booming population and expanding middle class — for trade and investments and firmly consolidating that position is another calculation critical to Beijing’s dealings with the continent. Third, China is also concerned with the protection of its economic investments as well as the safety of its surging number of citizens in Africa. For China, the way to securing these “hard” and broader Chinese interests is by directly helping Africa create an environment conducive to peace and stability; hence, Beijing’s calls and support for “African solutions to African security problems.” 

Moreover, China’s security engagements in Africa also serve its “soft” (indirect) national interests. By constantly reminding whoever wants to listen that China is the largest developing nation and Africa has the largest number of developing countries, Beijing effectively positions itself as the voice of the developing world. Its status as a veto power in the UN Security Council seals that positioning. Therefore, actively getting involved in Africa’s efforts to improve its security landscape effectively consolidates China’s carefully tailored image of a “responsible developing great power” vis-à-vis its African partners and the international community. Furthermore, although the thorny issue of international recognition of Taiwan (the “One China” policy) is becoming less significant in China-Africa relations (Swaziland/eSwatini is the only country in Africa to still maintains diplomatic ties with Taipei), the continent takes a strategic position in Beijing’s strategic efforts to “democratize” the international system and foster “south-south cooperation.” Thus, China’s security involvement in Africa, especially through peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, should be seen as exemplifying solidarity and multilateral cooperation between developing countries. 

But the growing activism of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in these missions also helps China achieve two other strategic objectives. Peace missions in Africa (and elsewhere) provide the PLA with much-needed operational experience through non-war military activities. They also provide China with a perfect opportunity to showcase its peaceful rise and its willingness to shoulder its international responsibilities. In that regard, Africa is China’s testing ground, a laboratory for Beijing to experiment with its security leadership, the results of which could help quell narratives on “the China threat.” 

To African countries, security relations with China provide unprecedented opportunities to strengthen their capacity-building efforts as a way of ending the recurring cycles of violence and insecurity. Likewise, for many African countries, Chinese presence in the continent in general and its security engagement in particular presents them with an alternative approach, a different way of doing “security,” since like China, many African countries recognize that security challenges facing them usually stem from (and are often reinforced by) poverty, discrimination, and accumulated grievances. Little wonder that, except for the controversial Chinese arms sales to some African countries, Beijing’s expanding security engagement in Africa has been a welcomed and long-overdue development, suggesting that China’s security interests in the continent often align pretty closely with those of its African counterparts. 

This also explains the increasing institutionalization of Sino-African security relations in recent years. For instance, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security in 2012 to mark a turning point in China-Africa relationship, with security issues gaining prominence. Indeed, the Partnership for Peace and Security, designed to provide financial assistance, capacity building, and other forms of institutionalized support to Africa’s security regime, also led to the establishment of a regular and consultative China-Africa Peace and Security Forum (in addition to FOCAC), the first of which took place in Beijing in July of this year. 

Such frameworks aim to increase contact and foster dialogues to “create synergy in thinking and action between the two sides” and strengthen policy alignment in China-Africa security relations. Thus, to fail to fully account for this mutual interest, as most discussions on China’s security engagements in Africa do, is to miss the fact that what African countries really need is a stable and secure environment to achieve their long-overdue goals of prosperity. China, for the most part, has been offering to contribute to that end in the pursuit of its own national interests. In a nutshell, what is remarkable about the growing Sino-African security relations is that they speak not of the heightened trepidation about China in Africa, but more of a symbiotic partnership that points to a politics of double coincidence of wants. 

Setting the Tone: A Snapshot of China’s Take on CORSIA and Beyond

                                                Background

Ahead of the International Civil Aviation Organization’s trinary general assembly in late September, China, along with Russia, issued a position paper denouncing the UN body’s aviation emissions plan. Better known as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), the plan is a medium-term scheme that aims to set caps emissions for international flights from 2020. Global aviation industry accounts for about 2% of all human-induced carbon emissions, but the share is expected to increase in the coming years as air travel becomes accessible to more people. To China, however, CORSIA “lacks moral fairness” since it fails “to ensure a level playing field to all countries.”

Instead, China calls for “promoting the establishment of a fair and equitable CORSIA implementation pathway featuring fairness and equity… through dialogue, consultation and negotiation”, rather than the one-size-fits-all orchestrated by the developed countries. China’s hardened public stance toward CORSIA runs against its earlier position as a critical proponent of the UN plan in 2016. It is, therefore, important to understand China’s position and its potential implications more broadly.

                                                China & CORSIA: Why a Step Back?

In denouncing CORSIA for lacking moral fairness, China effectively presents itself as the spokesperson of the developing countries and emerging economies. But it might be fair to argue that China was, first and foremost, defending it “right for development.” According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), for instance, China will overtake the US to become the world’s largest aviation market by 2024. This also means that, with the proposed CORSIA plan, China’s aviation industry would share more burden on reducing carbon emissions in the near future than is historically warranted, especially given that developed countries shoulder more historical responsibilities when it comes to carbon emissions.

For China and the developing world more broadly, however, increasing burden in carbon emissions reduction is not the only issues with CORSIA. It also threatens to quash the development and future potential of one of the key sectors in these countries’ national economies—the aviation industry. Therefore, China wants to ensure that CORSIA does not derail its growth potential with the proposed plan. As such, China’s criticism is unsurprising, especially given that Beijing has been pushing to ensure that its growing aviation industry is driven by indigenous players, ranging from services related to air travel to aircraft manufacturing.

                                                China’s Expanding Aviation Industry

Although the global duopoly of plane makers, Boeing Co. and Airbus SE., have been dominating the Chinese market for years, Beijing has increasingly been calling for its homegrown plane manufacturers with the aim of eventually breaking Boeing-Airbus strongholds. To the call, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) seems to have been answering. COMAC aims to firmly establish itself as an important player not just in the Chinese market but also in Asia and potentially globally.

Despite COMAC’s ambitions, however, the aircraft still relies on American and European imports for critical components, such as the engine, avionics, and landing gear. For instance, more than 50% of the materials for COMAC’s C1919 is produced outside China. Yet the aircraft was set to break Boeing-Airbus’ dominance in global aviation industry. Likewise, in developing its engine–the LEAP-1C–the Chinese aircraft manufacturer had to jointly work with the US and France. Surely, the lack of critical technology will continue to significantly hinder China’s aircraft manufacturing capabilities and substantially hinder Beijing’s push for greater “Made in China” in its aviation market. Worth noting is that, although it is unclear how (if at all) this connects to China’s shared position with Russia on CORSIA, China began a joint venture with Russia to develop the CR929 aircraft since May 2017. But even this joint venture does not entirely break the mentioned China’s dependence on imports of critical components from advanced and more experienced manufacturers.

Beijing’s seeming reversed take on CORSIA might be a huge blow to ICAO’s global efforts to curb carbon emissions. But it would be a mistake to view that as China’s move to loosen its commitments to fighting climate change and protecting the environment. As the position paper demonstrates, “China has been a consistent advocate for the establishment of a full consultation-based CORSIA.” Privately, moreover, China is taking steps to implement CORSIA’s guidelines, while pushing for the eligibility of its environmental projects that airlines could purchase under the scheme. 

Praise and Caution for Ethiopia's Prize Winner

Abiy Ahmed has been awarded this year’s Nobel Peace Prize. Never heard of him? You aren’t the only one. Official Washington has paid little attention to the extraordinary transition that began last year in Ethiopia under the new prime minster’s tutelage. The man in the eye-popping blazers—think sea foam green with pink stripes and leopard print inlays—began his tenure with equal flair: He lifted the long-repressed nation’s state of emergency, released thousands of political prisoners, halted media censorship, and appointed women to top posts. Winning international praise at each turn, he also ended two decades of frozen conflict with neighboring Eritrea—the act for which his prize was nominally bestowed. 

But the Nobel Committee’s announcement is also a call for attention: Abiy has finally taken the lid off Ethiopia, initiating one of the world’s most important political transitions, but also its most fragile.

Well aware of the challenges Abiy and his 110 million constituents face, and the problems already manifest, the committee’s announcement cited concern about growing “ethnic strife” and the social unrest that in recent years has displaced some three million people — more than anywhere else in the world. “No doubt some people will think this year’s prize is being awarded too early” they noted in pre-emptory fashion. But the committee believes “it is now” that the prime minister’s efforts “deserve recognition” and “need encouragement.” They’re right on both counts. 

Among Ethiopians (and many foreign observers), opinions of the 43-year old prime minister are as diverse as they are passionate. Supporters refer to him, not infrequently, as a “gift from god,” hailing his divinely inspired agenda and his rhetoric of unity and reconciliation. Critics balk at what’s become known as “Abiy-mania,” however, variously concerned that the Pentecostal preacher-in-chief is naïve, self-aggrandizing, or an unconvincing product of the old guard. (Abiy is a member of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, or EPRDF, which has ruled the country since 1991 and is known for its abuses of democracy and the security and intelligence establishment from whence he came.) 

Whatever one thinks of Abiy, he deserves genuine credit for ending a senseless stalemate with Eritrea, and for the gusto with which he has pledged to usher in an era of openness, modernity, and economic liberalization at home. Even prominent skeptics agree. After unprecedented protests gripped the nation in 2018, and in turn paved Abiy’s unlikely path to the top, one former regime figure told me that while he did not believe Abiy was the “right doctor for Ethiopia’s long-term care,” he may be the “emergency room medic we need” right now.

The prestigious recognition, while deserved, must be accompanied by a sober appreciation of what came before Abiy, and of the bumpy road ahead. The ruling EPRDF is a marriage of convenience, a four-tentacled coalition that allowed each ethno-regional arm a degree of autonomy and a share of the national cake. While famously disciplined and undeniably heavy-handed, proponents of the liberation movement-turned ruling party argued their formula is what has held one of Africa’s largest and most diverse countries together for three decades. 

At the center of the coalition was the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) — a minority from the country’s northern highlands that dominated the regime’s political and security structures until the passing of its intellectual strongman, Meles Zenawi, in 2012. Abiy isn’t one of them, and his ascension in 2018 was a watershed moment. The outgoing TPLF — unaccustomed to anything but total control — was thus believed to be the greatest threat to Abiy’s rule and his plan to overhaul the state they fashioned.

The new leader’s declaration of peace with Eritrea was an historic and courageous act. More than 80,000 died on the battlefield between 1998-2000, and the two countries had been locked in a tense standoff ever since. When Abiy and his Eritrean counterpart personally opened the border crossings last fall, his office announced the “radical transformation” of the border into a “frontier of peace and friendship.” Citizens from both countries flooded across the boundary for the first time in 20 years. When the first flight between the two nations touched down in Eritrea’s capital city, families long divided by war embraced on the tarmac, tears streaming down their faces. Abiy’s opening to Eritrea was right on its merits. But it was also motivated by domestic politics.

Much of the war was fought in Tigrayan territory, near the border with Eritrea, and the hostility between the TPLF and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki is hard to over-state. Abiy and Isaias thus shared an interest, as one seasoned observer noted, of “choking the life out of the TPLF.” Since Abiy’s arrival, TPLF bosses have left their privileged posts and returned home to Tigray — first to lick their wounds, and then to organize. And they aren’t alone — the powerful Amhara and Oromo constituencies have likewise reinvigorated their political cadres, their regional security forces, and their nationalist rhetoric. Some argue the EPRDF coalition will persist in one form or another, its inherent compromise too valuable to each constituent part. Others believe it is already dead.

National elections are slated for 2020. Some worry Abiy won’t be able to hold it together, much less to advance his sweeping domestic and regional agendas. (The border crossings to Eritrea have been closed again, and full implementation of the peace pact remains an aspiration.) Others fear that when the going gets tough, Abiy may resort to an all-too familiar playbook of repression. As such, the Nobel Committee is also hoping this year’s prize can both encourage its recipient to stay the course and act as a guardrail as his government enters a period of profound political uncertainty. 

This is not the first time Alfred Nobel’s trustees have sought to maximize the award’s political potential, or the first time its recipient has proven controversial. Aung San Suu Kyi, then a Burmese opposition figure, received the prize in 1991 for championing human rights and a “democratic society in which [her] country’s ethnic groups could cooperate in harmony.” She was later elected to the country’s top political post, and like Abiy, won great international acclaim. But when her government was accused of killings, human rights violations, and ethnic cleansing last year, many called for the Nobel committee to take back her prize.

Abiy Ahmed was right; the time for change in Ethiopia had come. Now he must balance tradition and modernity, democratization and stability, ethnic loyalties and national identity. The success or failure of Abiy’s high wire act will shape not only his country, but the entire region, for a generation to come.

When I asked another of the prime minister’s skeptics what he thought of last week’s Nobel announcement, he opted not for the usual cynicism, but for the spirit of unity Abiy has championed. “I am celebrating,” he said, “after all, this is the first Ethiopian ever to win the prize.” Here’s to hoping that all Ethiopians can celebrate Abiy’s prize for a generation to come, and that no one ever has to ask for it back. 

Read the original commentary on Brookings, posted on 15 October 2019 

The Making of Poverty in Rural China: A Snapshot of 70 Years of CPC’s Rule

As the Communist Party of China (CPC) prepares to celebrate the 70 anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this piece aims to offer a short analysis of the oft-forgotten struggles with extreme poverty in rural China. Few people would deny the fact that it was extreme poverty that paved the way for the Communist Party to gain popularity in China. And still fewer would deny the significant role the mass rural poor (peasants) played in helping it take the helm. In fact, the ‘great struggle’ brought the CPC to power was the struggle to end a century of humiliation by improving the economic and social lot of the Chinese people. Now in power, the Communist party had the task of fulfilling this historical mission. But then came the fateful idea of “Great Leap Forward”, which instead of changing China from a predominantly agrarian to a more modern and industrial society, greatly leaped the world’s largest country into unprecedented mass starvation and famine and social calamities. Yet, as if these disastrous consequences were not consequential enough, the Communist party engineered a decade-long revolution that needed not be: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 

If the Great Leap Forward resulted in millions of deaths due to mass starvation, the Cultural Revolution helped wipe out what little there was remaining. It, therefore, seemed clear that the Communist party of China was failing to realize its raison d'être. If the disastrous consequences of these policies were truly an existential crisis for the people, they were even more so for the party if it were to retain power. Until the late 1970s, about 81% of China’s population lived in rural areas and 84% lived in abject poverty, which--if China’s long history teaches us anything--is a ripened Pandora's box for social and economic upheavals. Nonetheless, the reform and opening up that began in 1978 offered a way out as the slow and incremental process of reforms in rural areas started soon to pay dividends. 

That is, when the Chinese leadership embarked on the path of transforming the economy through reform and opening up, the central aim, the driving objective was to change the appalling domestic miseries. According to Garnaut & co-,  “At the beginning of China’s reform and opening-up, the most pronounced developmental challenge the country faced was the elimination of poverty”. Combating poverty has, therefore, been at the forefront and the overarching agenda of the economic transformation from the fateful central planning, collectivization, and import-substitution industrialization to wider reforms and liberalization. Interestingly, the process of restructuring and reforming the economy in China, though still incomplete and largely imbalanced, seems to have left rural China, where it started, far behind. In just 40 years, for instance, more than 700 million Chinese people have been lifted out of poverty and China is home of over 600 billionaires, a number higher than anywhere else in the world. 

As a Report (2019) by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress makes it clear, there are daunting issues ahead. In its own words, “Despite the decisive progress in the fight against poverty, with the gradual advancement of poverty alleviation, the problem of deep poverty has become more prominent, and the difficulty of attacking has increased. There are still some practical difficulties and outstanding problems that cannot be ignored.” It also finds that, in 2018, “there were 16.6 million rural poor people in the country, about 400 poverty-stricken counties, and nearly 30,000 poverty-stricken villages.” This is definitely a significant figure even by China’s standards. In a 2015 address to the Global Poverty Reduction and Development Forum held in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared China’s resolve to eliminate extreme poverty by 2020. Since then, the government has continuously devised innovative initiatives and multiplied policies and financial support to pull over 70 million people out of extreme economic hardships: “the Chinese government will enact more support policies to pull up the country's 70 million poor people above the poverty line by 2020.” To that end, “China will engage in concerted efforts with the government and the public to fight the hard battle against poverty.” Nevertheless, misappropriations and mismanagement of poverty alleviation funds are major challenges facing China and its President, with the fast approaching deadline of 2020. As the Report quite accurately points out, rather than improving the still lagging behind rural infrastructure (roads, clean water, schools, housing, electricity, etc.), it is not uncommon that poverty alleviation funds end up in corrupt deals or even in individual pockets. It also argues that even the idea of promoting local industries to facilitate poverty alleviation in a more sustainable manner is still lagging far behind.

Furthermore, “in various places… formalism, bureaucracy, falsification, irritability and war-weariness, and negative corruption still exist to varying degrees”, thus also adding that “the implementation of central poverty alleviation deployment [in many cases] focuses only on short-term effects, and insufficient attention is paid to post-poverty work”; that is, little attention is paid to the long term sustainability of the poverty alleviation efforts, which makes little sense since one cannot declare victory on poverty only for those same people to fall back after a year or two. Finally, there are concerns that the rush to declare victory over poverty usually comes at the expense of the environment and some other equally important social issues such as urban poverty, widening regional and income inequalities, land ‘grabbing’ from farmers, etc. 

Nonetheless, these issues are more likely to be confined to secondary importance as the CPC looks to emphasis more on its great achievements to present itself as the only and ultimate ‘savior’ the country could ever have.

Path to the Africa We Want: Sustained Peace and Development

Whether Africa can become an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful [continent], driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in international arena” will fundamentally depend on its ability to achieve the twin goals of sustained peace and development. And here is why: 

In 2007, a report presented some striking findings on the costs of insecurity and instability on Africa’s development efforts. In the period between 1990 and 2005, for example, half of all deaths due to armed conflicts worldwide took place in Africa, and the continent became the host of world’s largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons. Moreover, during the same period, violent conflicts cost the continent about $300 billion, almost an equivalent amount of foreign aid it received throughout the same period. Indeed, civil wars, which are hitherto recurrent, have been the most devastating to the continent. According to Paul Collier, for instance, civil wars last about seven years, during which the GDP of the concerned countries shrink by around 15%. To return to pre-war economic performance, they would need about ten years and more than twenty extra years to attain the development levels they would have reached had they not descended into chaos. 

Yet Africa is intermittently mired in violent conflicts and insecurity, further frustrating its development initiatives. For example, the Peace Research Institute Oslo finds that 2015 and 2016 witnessed the most conflicts in Africa since 1946, a trend that would continue well into to 2017; and the Council on Foreign Relations reports that of the 25 ongoing conflicts worldwide, nine are in Africa. Unsurprisingly, many African countries have been dealing with various forms of instability. In fact, although some progress has been made since 2016 (when Africa recorded 21 fragile states of a total of 26 worldwide), 14 of the world’s top 20 most fragile states were African in 2018. Such state of affairs creates “increasingly ungoverned and ungovernable spaces” while similarly greatly hindering African countries’ attempts to prosper. Undoubtedly, this explains as much the fact that of the 15 UN Peacekeeping Missions worldwide, 8 are in Africa and nearly half (10) of the 21 UN Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements are deployed in the continent as it does the fact that Africa’s security issues represent more than 60% of all issues dealt with by the UN Security Council. With such a reality, the AU’s goal to “Silence the Guns by 2020” is an almost missed deadline. Yet, rather than giving ways to a sense of helplessness, these issues call for more urgent and more decisive actions, if only because this is undoubtedly the Africa we have, rather than the one we want. And to shape the Africa we want, more efforts and new thinking in tackling security and development issues are called for. 

What is clear though is that as they persist, security challenges have direct bearings on African countries’ development efforts. Indeed, many would agree that violent conflicts, with their high human, social, and economic costs, have been the most obliterating obstacle for the continent: lives are lost in untold numbers, people forcibly displaced, families and communities divided, future generations lost to ruins, and what little there may have been shattered. 

Nonetheless, if insecurity and instability frustrate development efforts in Africa, securitizing development has equally proven disastrous, as the nexus of security-development is much more convoluted. Perhaps, this intricacy is best captured by the former UN Secretary-General and late Kofi Annan when he once observed that “there is no long term security without development. There is no development without security”. In line with this premise, I argue that Africa needs to rethink its development strategies to ensure that both security and development are given equal priority. More specifically, I contend that

African countries’ ability to collaboratively and cooperatively achieve the twin goals of sustained peace and development will decide on the future of Agenda 2063 for the continent. 

Of the seven aspirations the Agenda set, aspiration number four, building “a peaceful and secure Africa”, will likely be the gateway to their materialization, because it entails effectively balancing the security-development nexus—whereby broader security measures adequately serve to promote sustainable development and development initiatives help foster efforts to consolidate long-term peace. As such, I primarily focus on this aspiration, which in turn requires three crucial initiatives to be realized: rethinking security, engaging the African youth, and fostering broader collaborative and cooperative efforts on security and development. 

                  Rethinking security 

Rethinking security in Africa fundamentally entails reconsidering Africa’s approach to security to ensure that security initiatives are integral parts of the broader development efforts i.e. striking a balance between hard-security issues (state security) and the broader human-security through poverty alleviation and inclusive prosperity. It also entails reinforcing and adapting the African Peace and Security Architecture as well as updating its pillars to sustainably promote and maintain peace, security, stability, and prosperity in the continent. In more practical terms, for instance, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts would be more conscious and purposeful in striving to holistically address the root causes of the conflicts and promote more inclusive development. They would also effectively adopt and adapt the DDR Programs—disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs—to fit each specific context. This would help end Africa’s recurrent violent conflicts as they prevent future outbreaks and foster more peaceful and inclusive societies. 

Moreover, rethinking security in Africa entails recognizing the fact that mismanagements and illegal exploration of Africa’s abundant natural resources (alongside deeply entrenched grievances, inequalities, and exclusions) have been playing a leading role in fueling and sustaining violent conflicts throughout the continent. For that reason, adopting, effectively enforcing, and transparently evaluating performance with natural resources management mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the Equator Principles (EPs), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), NEPAD’s guidelines for resource management, the ECOWAS’s Conflict Prevention Framework (as this has brought some successes in West Africa), etc. would be a necessary step forward, a concerted effort a better future. And although it is crucially important to reinforce regional and continental initiatives on resources management, it is equally important Africa learns from and adapt to its specific contexts the “good practices” and effectiveness of the international mechanisms. 

Finally, in rethinking security, Africa would do better to initiate and operationalize cross-regional interactions, dialogues, and learning. As such, the AU could reinforce its continental leadership role by aligning regional economic communities (RECs) to its agenda while allowing for more flexibility to tailor continental guidelines to meet regional and country contexts. To that end, the dual principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be given more momentum. It would be a trust-building process across the continent and across RECs. Perhaps, the African Standby Force, which has been divided in line with the existing RECS, is a good example, as it helps ensure a quick response to security challenges in each region. But more coordination and cooperation amongst them is needed, especially in cases where the challenges do not fit into the traditional geographical delimitations (as is the case with the cross-border crises in Nigeria and Cameroon). 

              Engaging the African youth 

There is a growing consensus that Africa’s failure to “take off” is largely due to its long practice of sidelining its vibrant and dynamic youths. That is, with its long history of marginalizing its young population, hence its future, Africa has been missing a lot. It is, therefore, time to better engage the African youths, empower young men and young women. That building an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa” is a fundamental task for each African cannot be overstated. As a crucial stakeholder, thorough participation of the African youths in shaping Africa’s future is as important as the aforementioned rethinking security in the continent. 

Yet to better harness Africa’s demographic dividend, the quality of education and training this a dynamic segment of Africa’s population receives would certainly play a determinant role. That it is quite impossible to build “an integrated Africa” without integrating the educational systems of its youths is to state the obvious. Hence rekindling, in the African youths, the spirit of a continental togetherness in forging Africa’s destiny would help promote the idea of peace, continental unity despite diversity as much as it would revitalize the sense of common destiny. For example, initiating continental exchange programs and regional and cross-regional working groups, youthful movements of which Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma talks about so passionately, would allow young Africans to learn from their shared knowledge, experience, and aspiration through interactions, exchanges, discussions, and even (positive) confrontations. Only when the youths feel empowered and meaningfully engaged, could there be “a peaceful and secure Africa” the aspiration four Agenda 2063 has called for. 

   Fostering broader collaborative and cooperative efforts on security and development  

In addition to empowering and engaging the African youths, building a secure and peaceful Africa also requires more collaborative and cooperative efforts at all levels of governance systems i.e. continental bodies, regional organizations, national governments, civil society, activists, etc. This would ultimately promote cross-border and regional dialogues and learning processes. In that regard, despite the fact that there is room for betterment, the newly established Continental Free Trade Area and the adoption and ongoing implementation of initiatives such as the Kampala Convention on internally displaced persons may serve as tangible results born out of combined and concerted efforts. 

Likewise, collaboration and cooperation would help the continent effectively claim ownership of its destiny and its development priorities, both of which are largely lacking to these dates. They would also help the continent use efficiently its limited resources to achieve measurable goals. Governance deficiencies have been identified to be detrimental to Africa’s development efforts. Yet fostering broader collaborative and cooperative efforts on peaceful and secure development would contribute to achieving Agenda 2063. Since it is obviously counterproductive to attempt to do too much, as it would dilute the efforts and weaken the impacts, it is imperative that peace and development strategies have informed focus, clearly defined priorities, implementation guidelines, and transparent and accountable evaluation mechanisms—all of which may be best achieved through intensive and rigorous research (R&D) and well-informed policy making, especially, given that security-development challenges are as dynamic as they are intertwined. 

To sum up, Africa faces daunting security and development challenges. Yet I strongly believe that the Agenda 2063 is achievable and must actually be achieved. To meet that imperative, however, I identify the aspiration number four of the Agenda as the gateway to realizing other aspirations. In finding a way forward, I argue that Africa needs to rethink its approach to security, better engage the African youths, and collaboratively and cooperatively work toward sustained peace, security, and inclusive prosperity. Certainly, the success or failure to take such bold and innovative measures, at such a critical moment of the continent’s history, will determine the future of Agenda 2063 and that of the continent more broadly, no less because “Destiny is not a matter of chance; it is a matter of choice; it is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to be achieved.” Thus Africa’s stakeholders must work together even more diligently in choosing and building the future of the Africa We Want.  

III-The Most Pressing Challenges to International Security: Why Nuclear Proliferation is One

According to hardcore Realist thinkers such as Kenneth Waltz, having more actors (states) possessed nuclear weapons may contribute better to international peace and security since no state would be willing to face mutual nuclear annihilation as a result of a direct nuclear confrontation. This idea is the backbone of what is known as “Nuclear Deterrence Stability” (or what some commentators dubbed “stability under madness”). Indeed, at prima facie, the idea seems compelling enough, especially given the fact that no nuclear war has ever been fought since the end of the WWII despite the massive proliferation of nuclear weapons the world has seen thereafter. 

Nevertheless, had this premises been correct, one would certainly expect almost no country to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as it strives to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, well over 180 countries are now signatories to the NPT, making it a near-universal regime on nuclear limitation that will undoubtedly have long term implications. In fact, although nuclear weapons are widely perceived as an effective deterrent against actual or potential aggressors, there are many issues associated with them, ranging from the costs of maintaining their facilities to accidental nuclear strikes. That is not all, however. Just like they could fall into the hands of non-state actors and, especially, terrorist organizations, who could utilize them indiscriminately for their malicious purposes, nuclear weapons could also be used for expansive and aggressive purposes (rather than defensive ones) by ambitious state actors. Even more challenging is the difficulty in discerning when a state uses its nuclear capabilities for defensive or offensive purposes since in many cases those capabilities can serve both ends simultaneously.

While vertical proliferation helps amplify the challenges caused by rising great powers, the cost of maintenance, the looming possibility of an accidental nuclear strike, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons to subvert other states (for expansive and aggressive purposes) add to this entangling complexity. By the same token, however, horizontal proliferation also has the inherent danger of spreading nuclear materials to “unwanted”, unstable, and even crabby actors. That is, the horizontal proliferation increases the possibility for terrorist groups to acquire nuclear materials, possibly allowing them to make nuclear weapons either independently or in collaboration with “friendly” state(s)—a state-sponsored nuclearized terrorism?

Nonetheless, if the prospects for terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons seem low, the possibility of a nuclear disaster at any given moment seems to loom large. Otherwise stated, since the adoption of the NPT in 1970, horizontal proliferation has dramatically slowed down (or nearly halted); yet the issues of nuclear weapons have never gone away. And to a larger extent, this is due to vertical proliferations and the fact that some states party to NPT such as North Korean and Iran have acquired or attempting to do so despite the Treaty. The danger, however, is that vertical nuclear proliferation not only amplifies great power competitions, but it also undermines the credibility of the NPT, since as Graham Thomas (2004), argues, the Treaty is based on a central bargain, whereby: “the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals”. To these days, however, it is obvious that the latter close (nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear arsenals) has been a dramatic failure.

In sharp contrast to Graham Thomas (2004)’s determined optimism, vertical nuclear proliferation is increasingly rendering the NPT a “nuclear apartheid” regime of some sort, as it de facto provides privileged “great-power” statuses to a small group of nuclear states while confining other states, the non-nuclear majority, to a “second-class status”. As such, there is little doubt that the success or failure to maintain both ends of the bargain will be the determinant factor for the future of nuclear armaments in general, and the NPT, as a near-universal nuclear regime, in particular.

It is actually intriguing that many international security strategists have stuck to their mantra that building and maintaining a stronghold on nuclear arsenals is still the best course of action in boosting state security, notwithstanding history and historical records showing otherwise. Consider, for example, Trachtenberg (1985), who questions the political utility of nuclear weapons in the international relations of states. In his study of the role nuclear weapons played in the Cuban missile crisis, Trachtenberg (1985) concludes that the crisis clearly demonstrated the political insignificance and even the political irrelevance of nuclear weapons. Citing a prominent figure in the Kennedy administration, Robert McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense, Trachtenberg (1985) argues that America’s nuclear superiority "was not such that it could be translated into usable military power to support political objectives” while Dean Rusk, the former Secretary of State, is even blunter on that matter. For Dean Rusk, nuclear power does not translate into usable political influence. Indeed, it is a lesson the US should have learnt long before the Cuban crisis, since the US-Soviet struggles over the defeated Germany, the struggle that helped start the Cold War, showed that the United States could not use its nuclear monopoly to impose its political will on the Soviet bloc although many American leaders at the time hoped that would be the case. Yet apparently, people do not learn or at least they forget to learn from these historical circumstances.

Perhaps the most daunting challenge with nuclear proliferation is when two or more acrimonious states acquire nuclear weapons. And there is no better example today than the case of India and Pakistan, both of which are nuclear states and none of which is a signatory to the NPT. As aforementioned, nuclear weapons have always been, in the words of Noam Chomsky (2017), “an existential challenge”. But the nuclearization of the Indo-Pakistan animosity has brought that challenge to even an indescribable level. For these two states, it is not beyond possibility that their confrontations could easily escalate to a nuclear disaster, which is facilitated by their seemingly incompatible nuclear postures and differing political regimes; for instance, although there are discussions that India might change its nuclear posture, the state is still (at least rhetorically) adhering to a no-first-use doctrine while Pakistan, due to its weak position and limited conventional capabilities vis-à-vis India, relies more on the first-use posture to deter any potential Indian conventional armed assaults. A nuclear confrontation between the two, however, would be disastrous at the utmost as it would further destabilize the already largely unstable region, generate refugees in a gigantesque proportion, and cost innumerable human lives. Such is the real challenge of nuclear weapons and their proliferation.

To sum up, terrorism, however one understands it, may be receiving more international attention; it may even be the most covered topic on international media; yet there are more pressing, more urgent, and more challenging issues to international peace and security that call for immediate attention and practically workable solutions. Here, I identify nuclear proliferation as one of such issues. First, nuclear weapons and nuclear armaments have always embodied catastrophic and disastrous consequences to the very existence of human beings. Second, it facilitates and intensifies the issues of great powers competitions, as the continued expansion of the nuclear arsenals and massive nuclear armament programs from the US and Russia illustrates. In that regard, George Lee Butler is probably right that “we have so far survived the nuclear age by some combinations of skill, luck and divine intervention—probably the latter in greatest proportion.” Third, nuclear proliferation threatens the credibility of the NPT and therefore the future global peace and security while it also makes peaceful settlements of the dispute between historically acrimonious states almost impossible. 

II- The Most Pressing Challenges to International Security: Why Nuclear Proliferation is One

Indeed, despite the often dramatically conflated international coverage on terrorism, and despite the attention it receives on the international stage as a major issue, there are more pressing issues to global peace and security.

Nuclear proliferation is one example. There is almost no denying that the issue of nuclear proliferation has always been an urgent and pressing challenge to world peace and security since the inception of nuclear weapons. Indeed, there are several reasons to believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a major (if not the major) challenge to world peace and security today, nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War.

Conceptually, nuclear proliferation is to be understood as both vertical proliferation (the increase in nuclear arsenals of a nuclear state) and horizontal proliferation (the acquisition of nuclear weapons (or their materials) by new actors). This understanding is crucially important for the development that follows. Thus, my central argument is that the proliferation of nuclear weapons inherently endangers world peace and security, regardless of whether we are talking about vertical or horizontal proliferation. Moreover, the conceptualization also helps shed light on the challenges stemming from “the rise of great power” in our age of nuclear armaments and great power competitions. For that reason, I also argue that, despite the promise that led to the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, little is actually being done beyond mere political rhetorics to bring about a world free of intermittent nuclear threats.

Few people, for instance, would deny today that nuclear weapons have always been horrendous from their inception. In that sense, one only needs to consider the bombing of the two Japanese cities—Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the near nuclear-apocalypse brought about by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 to understand the inherent dangers nuclear weapons embody. That is, the fact that they are of horrendous implications and that they are of immeasurable destructions with enduring consequences is well beyond doubt. Perhaps, Schelling (2008)’s marked observation sums it up in the most forceful way possible. In Arms and Influence, for instance, Schelling (2008) opens his 1966 preface with the striking remark that: “One of the lamentable principles of human productivity is that it is easier to destroy than to create… And a country can destroy more with twenty billion dollars of nuclear armament than it can create with twenty billion dollars of foreign investment. The harm that people can do, or that nations can do, is impressive. And it is often used to impress”. With such a gloomy yet compelling principle “of human productivity” in mind, it would interesting to now consider how each of the proliferation (horizontal and vertical) constantly threatens global peace and security. (Soon to come)!

I- The Most Pressing Challenges to International Security: Why Terrorism May not be One

      The seemingly simple task of defining the term “terrorism” belies the daunting challenges in dealing with the issue, both as a concept and as a phenomenon. Indeed, beyond the fact that “terrorism” is a “bad” thing and therefore carries pejorative implications, there seems to be little common understanding of the term. As Pillar (2001) argues in The dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, although it is often broadly understood as a politically motivated act of indiscriminate violence on civilian population, the term has come to mean different things to different people; it has also become a nametag used to demonize, dehumanize, and vilify the perceived “other” (i.e. it is not uncommon for politicians and political actors to portrait their rivals and oppressors with such a nametag; also common are words like Muslim terrorists, Middle Eastern terrorists, and in a more disparaging Trumpian parlance, Mexican terrorists)—all of which help further compound the difficulty. But this tendency is equally true beyond mere political discourses, and perhaps, best epitomized by the popular motto that “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”.

     Moreover, if it is difficult to define the term, it is even challenging to gauge the scope or the degree to which it constitutes a major challenge to international security in the post-Cold War era. Plainly stated, despite the unwavering attention the issue of terrorism attracts, it is highly reasonable to believe that the threats to international security, stemming from terrorist acts, are generally over exaggerated. A case in point, consider the United States, for instance, which has been the leading actor in countering (some people would say, ‘promoting’ by virtue of some of its foreign policies) terrorism at home and abroad. The number of annual death caused by terrorist attacks, since 9/11, are overwhelmingly low compared to losses of lives due to gun-related violence, drug usage, car crashes, unintentional drowning, etc. Therefore, judged by their human costs, one would expect them to make the headlines. Instead, these tragedies usually get far less attention than they would warrant.

      In short, if considered by the attention it receives on the international stage (global media), terrorism may be seen as a major international security issue. But the truth of the matter remains that there are more pressing issues to global peace and security than the usually dramatically conflated international coverage on terrorism would have us believe. 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The bombing of the two Japanese cities—Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the near nuclear-apocalypse brought about by the Cuban missile crisis in the 1962 neatly demonstrated the horrendous consequences nuclear weapons can inflict. Indeed, although they are widely perceived as an effective deterrent against actual or potential aggressors, there are many issues associated with nuclear weapons, ranging from the costs of maintaining their facilities to accidental nuclear strikes. Moreover, just like they could fall into the hands of non-state actors and terrorist groups who could utilize them indiscriminately for their malicious purposes, nuclear weapons could also be used for expansive and aggressive purposes (rather than defensive ones) by ambitious state actors.

It comes to no surprise, therefore, that there have been concerted efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the late 1960s, paving the way to what is now known as the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Plainly stated, due to their enormous destructive potential, containing nuclear weapons capability is crucially important.

Broadly speaking, there are three defining elements or mechanisms for understanding the international efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons: the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the nuclear export control system.

Although negotiations to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons started in 1965, it was only in 1970 that the NPT was established (came into force), and in 1995 it was extended indefinitely. With a total of 188 states party to the Treaty, the NPT has become a nearly-universal regime on nuclear limitation. And according to Graham, Jr., Thomas, the NPT is based on a central bargain whereby: “the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals”. That is, he argues, “the NPT was not designed to establish “nuclear apartheid,” permanently authorizing great-power status and nuclear weapons to a small group of states and assigning the rest of the world to permanent second-class status”. Therefore, the success or failure to maintain both ends of the bargain will be the determinant factor for the future of the NPT.

 Also important to the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime is the nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensures that states comply with their international obligations on nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, the nuclear export control system, comprised of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), monitors and controls exported nuclear materials to ensure that those materials are in compliance with the international norms (e.g. peaceful nuclear technology or for civil nuclear energy). Perhaps, it is noteworthy to mention that the aforementioned mechanisms are enhanced by additional agreements such as the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials During Their Use, Storage, and Transportation as well as several other agreements creating regional nuclear weapon-free zones.