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The Plague of Military Coups and the African Union’s Peace and Security Dilemma

September 8, 2021 at 12:45 am, No comments

“A French-trained special forces officer, a disoriented and shaken 83-year-old president bundled out of the [presidential] palace and into a car, and promises of a new constitution and a new order.” So run the headlines about the latest military coup in Guinea that toppled the “disoriented and shaken 83-year-old” Alpha Condé. African countries are no strangers to military (and bloody) takeover. It is, after all, estimated that African countries have recorded no less than 200 coups since the years of independence, counting both successful and failed coup attempts.

In West Africa alone, Guinea is the third country to experience a violent transfer of power in the past five months. In April, Chad went through a “covert coup” that brought Mahamat Idriss Deby to power, following the sudden death of his father, Idris Deby, who spent more than three decades in power and was one of Africa's longest-serving presidents. In May, Mali experienced a second coup in just nine months, after the transitional government was overthrown by the military. But had the attempted coup on the night of March 30-31 in Niger succeeded, the unwanted statistics could have been even more staggering. Undoubtedly, this poses enormous challenges to Africa’s broader peace and security environment and, especially, to the African Union (AU)’s ambitious goal of silencing the guns across the continent and achieving sustainable peace and security.

The Need for Proactiveness, Consistency, and Boldness

Despite the complexity and distinctiveness of each case of the military takeover, one can make the case that more proactiveness and consistency from both the AU and its regional bodies (Regional Economic Communities, RECs) could reduce such growing occurrences. Just like Mali and Chad, Guinea has a long history of instability and military takeovers. Yet not enough was done to prevent Alpha Condé from extending his rule to a controversial and highly contested third term. In 2010, he became the first democratically elected leader in Guinea since its independence. But after completing the constitutionally mandated two term-limit, he amended the constitution to stay in power. Unsurprisingly, the move sparked widespread protests that were met with force and brutality. Thus, the coup came in the context of simmering and growing discontent in the country, which the military successfully took advantage of. When the authority and the legitimacy of a government are widely contested, it finds no ground to stand on when or if tested. We saw that in Afghanistan before Condé's fall, where the United States and its allies thought to have built a functioning state during the 20 years of occupation. But the people on the ground (especially the Afghan army) knew too well that they had no leadership to defend. A bold and proactive African Union and its West African regional body could have surely seen this coming.

The lack of consistency is another major faux pas for the continental body. The African Union is built on a set of common and shared values, norms, and principles, as stipulated in its various legal documents, most notable the Constitutive Act but also the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of governments. A major and most recent example of inconsistency in relation to the topic at hand is the open endorsement of what was clearly an unconstitutional change of government in Chad following the death of its former president Idriss Déby. By designating Déby’s son, the military power grab clearly violated Article 81 of the Chadian constitution, which states that the president of the National Assembly would act as interim president in such circumstances and calls for elections to be held within 45–90 days. Instead, the military quickly dissolved the National Assembly and the government and suspended the constitution. It set itself to assume total power over the 18-month transition period, with the possibility of further extending it. The inconsistent decision-making on such issues will surely help erode the AU’s authority.

The good news, however, is that it is not too late for the continental body to prove its relevance. And perhaps Guinea could serve as a wakeup call that will finally awaken it from the functional and institutional ineptness. That is, while the AU has worked hard to disincentivize coups and other forms of unconstitutional changes of government, it has not done enough to eradicate their root causes, which include election tampering, constitutional amendments by incumbents to stay in power, failed governance, etc.

Good to Know: The decision on Chad contrasts sharply with its previous decisions that almost applied membership suspension of the concerned country and various sanctions of the soldiers involved. Thus, the AU has suspended any state where the military or armed groups have clearly grabbed power over the past 20 years (as shown below).

Country

Nature of the change in power

Date

PSC decision

The Central African Republic

François Bozizé, with the help of mercenaries, overthrows president André Kolingba

March 2003

Immediate suspension

Togo

At the death of Gnassingbé Eyadema, Faure Gnassingbé comes to power with the support of the military and after a controversial revision of the constitution

February 2005

Immediate suspension
(Prior to the PSC decision, Togo was suspended by ECOWAS, which also imposed sanctions on Togolese authorities)

Mauritania

A military junta led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall overthrows president Maaouiya Ould Taya

August 2005

Immediate suspension

Mauritania

Sidi Ould Cheick Abdallahi is overthrown by Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, head of the presidential guard

August 2008

Immediate suspension

Guinea

Captain Moussa Dadis Camara takes power following the death of Lansana Conté

December 2008

Suspension within five days at a second meeting of the PSC on Guinea

Madagascar

Part of the army overthrows president Marc Ravalomanana and brings Andry Rajoelina to power

March 2009

Immediate suspension

Niger

Mamadou Tandja is overthrown by soldiers

February 2010

Immediate suspension

Mali

Soldiers overthrow president Amani Toumani Touré

March 2012

Immediate suspension

Guinea-Bissau

Soldiers overthrow the interim president Raimundo Pereira

April 2012

Immediate suspension

The Central African Republic

Rebels overthrow president François Bozizé

March 2013

Immediate suspension and sanctions

Egypt

Soldiers led by Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew President Mohamed Morsi

July 2013

Immediate suspension

Burkina Faso

General Gilbert Diendéré and elements under his command briefly overthrow transitional president Michel Kafando

September 2015

Immediate suspension and sanctions

Sudan

The military deposes president Omar al-Bashir following months of public protests against the regime

April 2019

Delayed suspension:

the PSC initially gave the military two weeks to hand over power to civilians. The deadline was subsequently extended to 60 days. Following protests and the killing of civilians, the PSC suspended Sudan about three weeks before the new deadline.

Mali

Soldiers depose president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta following several weeks of public protests against the regime

August 2020

Immediate suspension

Mali

Soldiers toppled the transitional government to now take over complete control

June 2021

Immediate suspension


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